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This paper studies the evolution of US state health expenditure for a sample that covers 1966–2014. Our results
provide evidence against the existence of a single pattern of behavior of personal health care expenditure across
the US states. Rather, we can observe the existence of two statistically different convergence clubs. We cannot find
evidence of convergence when we disaggregate health expenditure into its three main payers: Medicare, Medicaid
and private health insurance expenditure, whilst we again find evidence of convergence clubs. However, the
estimated clubs for Medicaid and private health insurance expenditure are statistically different that estimated for
total health expenditure. Consequently, our results offer strong evidence of heterogeneity in the evolution of US
health expenditure. The analysis of the forces that drive club creation shows that economic situation and some
supply-side factors are important. We can also appreciate that some healthcare outcome variables are only related
to private insurance health expenditure. The other health expenditures, thus, show a certain lack of efficiency
which may be due to practices that have little benefit for patient health.1. Introduction
Health care expenditure (HCE) has been rising sharply in most
developed countries for at least the last three decades. This process has
been facilitated by economists' efforts to identify the driving factors that
can help us to understand the evolution of HCE. Since the seminal paper
of Newhouse (1977) and, until the recent paper of Hartwig and Sturm
(2014), who review the determinants of HCE suggested in the literature
for 33 OECD countries in 1970–2010, national income or Gross Domestic
Product has been considered as the most important determinant of HCE.
Given this central role of income, as it converges among territories,
HCE could also be expected to converge, especially if we bear in mind
that technological advancement, which is a major contributor to HCE,
tends to be common among territories, as is stated in Newhouse (1992).
Therefore, as countries grow over time, consumers may demand new
medical services and procedures and contribute to the convergence of
HCE, as Pekkurnaz (2015) points out.
However, following Villaverde et al. (2014), the interest of the re-
searchers on investigating the issue of HCE convergence/divergence inrt of the MEC, project ECO2015-6
to Donald G. Freeman, Sam Hous
anonymous referees.
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US state health expenditure cohealth expenditures is relatively recent. In this regard, we should cite the
works of Barros (1998), Alcalde-Unzu et al. (2009), Fallahi (2011),
Panopoulou and Pantelidis (2011) and Pekkurnaz (2015) who focus on
OECD countries, whilst Hitiris (1997), Nixon (2000), Hitiris and Nixon
(2001), Hofmarcher et al. (2004), Kerem et al. (2008), Villaverde et al.
(2014) and Lau et al. (2014) consider the European Union. The findings
of these studies are mixed. Some papers, such as Hitiris and Nixon (2001)
and Alcalde-Unzu et al. (2009), found convergence. By contrast, some
others, such as Montanari and Nelson (2013) and Lau et al. (2014), are
not so favorable to this hypothesis.
Giving the high degree of heterogeneity among countries with
different health systems due to law, financing or management, this result
is not unexpected, especially if we take into account the results of
Clemente et al. (2004) and Costa-Font and Pons-Novell (2007). Conse-
quently, convergence is more probable across regions within a country
than across countries. We should note the existence of a growing litera-
ture related to the analysis of convergence in health expenditure, the case
of the United States being particularly attractive. There are several rea-
sons for this choice.5967-R, and of the Aragonese Government, project S-124. The usual disclaimer
ton State University, for providing us with the dataset for the period 1966–1990.
bruary 2019
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1 See Apergis and Payne (2017), Herrerias et al. (2017) and Tian et al. (2016)
for good examples of the use of this methodology.
J. Clemente et al. Economic Modelling xxx (xxxx) xxxFirst, US health spending is significantly higher than in other devel-
oped countries. The share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP hereafter)
devoted to health care was around 11.9% in 1991, increasing to 16.4% in
2009. During the last fifty years, the total health expenditure as a share of
GDP has more than tripled, as stated in Bose (2015). For the same dates,
Canada spent 9.1% and 10.6% and, among the European countries, the
United Kingdom spent 5.5% and 8.7% of its GDP on health. In sum, the
United States spends twice as much per capita on health care as any other
advanced nation in the world, as Rugy (2013) points out.
Second, following Wang (2009b), convergence is likely to have
occurred more rapidly amongst American states than among the EU or
OECD countries because American states are more homogeneous in
medical technology, consumer preferences, health policies and the
structure and general characteristics of the health care system.
Finally, the American health care system presents some peculiarities.
Despite the high health spending, the USA does not have universal health
insurance coverage. The two largest government health care programs,
Medicare andMedicaid, which, in 2014, represented 23% and 17% of the
total health expenditure, respectively, coexist with an extensive system of
private insurance, 34% of the total health expenditure. The segmented
character of this health system can introduce some kind of divergence
among states. Important differences also exist with respect to public
programs.
Given this heterogeneous starting point, it comes as no surprise that
the results of the convergence of health expenditure in the American
states are far from conclusive. Wang (2009a) makes a first analysis of
convergence for per capita personal health expenditure and its nine
components for 1980–2004. He finds moderate evidence of convergence
with respect to total health expenditure and diverse results for its com-
ponents, concluding that hospital costs are responsible for the observed
convergence. Panopoulou and Pantelidis (2013), applying the method-
ology designed in Phillips and Sul (2007) to the same database used by
Wang (2009a), conclude that there is no full convergence in health
expenditure among the US states. Instead, states form two groups that
converge to two different equilibria (clubs). At the same time, they find
no convergence for the main components of HCEs. Even more recently,
Apergis et al. (2017) studies the convergence of health expenditures in all
US states for the 1966–2009. They employ the results of Freeman (2012)
who builds the database for the 1966–1990 period. Furthermore, Apergis
et al. (2017) use data by State of Residence instead of by the State of
Providers used in preceding papers. According to these authors, their
empirical analysis provides overwhelming evidence of convergence in
per capita real health care expenditure. This convergence may be due to
the convergence of personal disposable income among states.
We can then appreciate that there is no clear conclusion on the
convergence of the US health expenditures. However, as Apergis et al.
(2017) recognize, convergence should be continuously re-evaluated as
new data becomes available. Against this background, the aim of this
paper is to re-analyze the possible existence of convergence in US health
expenditure from the perspective of the State of Residence. To that end,
we use the data recently published by the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services Health Expenditures that has extended the previous
database up to 2014. This data has not been commonly employed in the
previously mentioned literature, with the abovementioned exception of
Apergis et al. (2017). Additionally, we disaggregate the total personal
health care expenditure into its three main payers (Medicare, Medicaid
and private health insurance expenditures) in order to offer a more
complete analysis of the US health regional variations. We employ the
methodology designed in Phillips and Sul (2007), previously used in
Panopoulou and Pantelidis (2013) for a shorter sample, to test the null
hypothesis of convergence. If we reject it, we can try to identify the ex-
istence of some convergence clubs and, subsequently, study the factors
that may help us to understand the formation of these clubs. Further, we
compare the evolution of some healthcare outcome variables across the
different convergence clubs in order to analyze whether the variation in
health expenditure implies a variation in health status, a question which2has recently been analyzed in some very interesting papers, such as those
of Finkelstein et al. (2016) and Cutler et al. (2018).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the
methodology. Section 3 presents the data and the analysis of the results.
Finally, Section 4 draws the most important conclusions and some policy
implications.
2. Methodology
In this section, we briefly outline the methodology that we will
employ to test for the presence of a convergence process in the health
expenditures of the US states. We will follow the papers of Phillips and
Sul (2007, 2009) where they develop a framework that allows us, first, to
test the convergence hypothesis and, if this hypothesis is rejected, to
estimate the convergence clubs that make up the US state health
expenditure behavior. The methodology developed in Phillips and Sul
(2007) is closely related to the standard sigma-convergence analysis, a
concept introduced by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990) and Barro et al.
(1991), in that it tests for the decline of the variable of interest over time
in the cross-sectional dispersion. However, it clearly outperforms the
classical convergence analysis, namely, the abovementioned
sigma-convergence concept and the beta-convergence concept, which
was first introduced by Baumol (1986). The methodology proposed in
Phillips and Sul (2009) is based on a general nonlinear time-varying
factor model, which admits the presence of transitional heterogeneity.
If this is the case, standard unit root and cointegration statistics are no
longer appropriate to test for convergence. Furthermore, this method-
ology can be interpreted as an asymptotic cointegration test that does not
suffer from the well-known problems of standard unit root and cointe-
gration tests. Additionally, it is flexible with respect the time properties
of the variables under analysis because it does not impose any particular
assumption about them, a crucial point if we take into account the results
of Apergis et al. (2017). Finally, it is clearly free of the criticism received
by the beta-convergence analysis in de Long (1988) and Quah (1993). As
a consequence, the use of this methodology has recently become very
popular in convergence analysis.1
Following Phillips and Sul (2007), let us consider that Xit represents
the variable of interest (the different health expenditures we will
consider in this paper) with i being the cross-section dimension (in our
case, the 50 US states and, for the disaggregated data, we will add the
District of Columbia) and t representing the sample covered by the data
(our largest sample will cover 1966–2014). This variable can be
decomposed as Xit¼ δit μt, where μt is a common component and δit is the
idiosyncratic one. Phillips and Sul (2007) suggest testing for convergence
by analyzing whether δit converges towards δ. To do so, they first define
the relative transition component:
hit ¼ Xit
N1
PN
i¼1Xit
¼ δit
N1
PN
i¼1δit
(1)
In the presence of convergence, hit should converge towards unity,
whilst its cross-sectional variation (Hit) should go to 0 when T moves
toward infinity,
Hit ¼ N1
XN
i¼1ðhit  1Þ
2→0; as T→∞ (2)
Further, we should estimate the following equation:
log
H1
Ht
 2log½logðtÞ ¼ αþ β logðtÞ þ ut; t ¼ ½rT  þ 1;…;T (3)
Table 1
Testing for convergence.
Variable bβ t-stat
Panel I. Aggregated analysis.
PHCE (sample 1966–2014) 1.00 23.28
Panel II. Disaggregated analysis. Sample 1991–2014
Personal Health Care 1.06 249.33
Medicare 0.49 15.23
Medicaid 0.85 67.34
Sample 2001–2014
Private Health Insurance 1.18 55.96
This table reports the statistic proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007) to test for
convergence. The term log-t stands for a parameter which is twice the speed of
convergence of this club towards the average. t-stat is the convergence test sta-
tistic, which is asymptotically distributed as a simple one-sided t-test with a
critical value of 1.65. See Phillips and Sul (2007) for further details.
*means the rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence.
2 The results of this section have been obtained by using the codes that can be
J. Clemente et al. Economic Modelling xxx (xxxx) xxxwith r taking values in the (0.2, 0.3) interval. Equation (3) is
commonly known as the log-t regression. The null hypothesis of
convergence is tested by way of a standard t-statistic for testing the Ho:
β¼ 0 null hypothesis versus the HA: β< 0 alternative hypothesis. The
null hypothesis is rejected whenever this t-statistic takes values lower
than 1.65.
If we reject convergence, Phillips and Sul (2007) propose the
following robust clustering algorithm for identifying clubs in a panel:
i. Order the N states according to their final values
ii. Starting from the highest-order state, add adjacent states from our
ordered list and estimate model (3). Then, select the core group by
maximizing the value of the convergence t-statistic, subject to the
restriction that it is greater than 1.65.
iii. Continue adding one state at a time of the remaining states to the
core group, and re-estimate model (3) for each formation. Use the
sign criterion (t-statistic >0) to decide whether a state should join
the core group.
iv. For the remaining states, repeat steps (ii)–(iii) iteratively and
stop when clubs can no longer be formed. If the last group does
not have a convergence pattern, conclude that its members
diverge.
Phillips and Sul (2007, 2009) note that the use of a sign criterion in
step (ii) may lead to an over-estimation of the number of clubs. Phillips
and Sul (2007) recommend performing club merging tests after running
the algorithm using equation (3).
Finally, we have followed the suggestion made in Phillips and Sul
(2007) and we have extracted the trend components of the series by the
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter. This technique is well-suited to
extracting long-run trends from the data while eliminating short-run
erratic behavior. We should note that this filter is quite sensitive to the
selection of the smoothing parameter, as is observed in Ravn and Uhlig
(2002). We have applied the standard value λ¼ 400 across the paper.
However, the results are robust to the use of different values of this
parameter, as can be seen in Table A.1. of the Appendix.
3. Data and empirical results
3.1. Data
The data have been obtained from the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services Health Expenditures by State of Residence. This data
base currently covers 1991–2014. However, we can extend this sample
by taking into account the results of Freeman (2012), who provides in-
formation of health expenditure by state of residence for 1966–1990 for
50 states (the District of Columbia is not included). So, the sample for
personal health care spending (PHCE hereafter) will cover the
1966–2014 for 50 states. Further, we consider it of interest to disaggre-
gate this information and analyze the main components of the PHCE,
namely Medicare, Medicaid and private health insurance expenditures
(PHIE hereafter). These data are not considered in Freeman (2012) and,
therefore, we cannot extend the official database. Thus, the sample will
cover 1991–2014 for Medicaid and Medicare expenditures, whilst the
sample for the PHIE that only covers 2001–2014. We have 51 states for
this disaggregated analysis because we have information for the District
of Columbia. We should note that in all the cases we will employ the state
health expenditures in per capita terms, dividing the raw data by the
population figures obtained from the regional database of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA). Finally, we employ the aggregate US consumer
price index to convert the nominal data into 2017 real values, given that
this state-level index is not available during the entire period under
study. An excellent descriptive analysis of these data can be found in
Lassman et al. (2017).33.2. Results2
3.2.1. Personal health care expenditure
Panel I of Table 1 presents the results of applying the Phillips and Sul
(2007) methodology to the PHCE. As we can see, the estimated value of
the β parameter is-1.00 and it is statistically lower than 0, given that its
corresponding t-statistic takes the value 23.38 (<-1.65). Thus, we can
reject the null hypothesis of convergence, contrary to the results pre-
sented in Apergis et al. (2017) for 1966–2009, but in line with those
obtained in Panopoulou and Pantelidis (2013). The presence of multiple
patterns of behavior in health expenditure is implicitly assumed in the
recent papers of Finkelstein et al. (2016) and Cutler et al. (2018) where
the sources of the US regional health variations are analyzed. However,
we should note that convergence clubs may exist, which leads us to use
the algorithm in order to detect them. Table 2 presents the estimated
clubs. Figs. 1 and 2 present the geographic distribution of the conver-
gence clubs and the average values of the PHCE for the states included in
the clubs, respectively.
Fig. 1. a shows that there is a clear geographical division between the
states included in these clubs, club 2 being mostly composed of southern
and western states. More precisely, club 2 includes the southern states in
the Pacific and Mountain US Census divisions plus 6 states that belong to
the South Region (AL, AR, GA, TN, TX and VA).
Fig. 2. a reflects the evolution of the average values of the per capita
PHCE for the different estimated clubs. We can observe that the average
expenditure of the states in club 1 is always greater than that of club 2.
The evolution of the two indexes is quite similar until the beginning of
the 1990s but after that, the distance between these average values grows
continually until 2014, mainly because club 1 grew at a rate of 3.0%
during 1991–2000, whilst club 2 did so at a rate of 1.9%. During the 21st
century the two growth rates have been quite similar, 2.6% and 2.4%,
respectively, for clubs 1 and 2.
3.2.2. Disaggregated analysis: medicare, medicaid and private health
insurance
We consider it interesting to analyze the evolution of the three main
payers of the PHCE, namely Medicare, Medicaid and private health in-
surance expenditures. We should recall that the available data is clearly
smaller for these cases, covering 1991–2014 for Medicare and Medicaid
expenditure and 2001–2014 for the private health insurance expendi-
ture. Consequently, the results should be interpreted with more caution,
especially for this latter component.
First, we can see that the values of the statistic proposed by Phillipsfound at: http://www.utdallas.edu/~d.sul/papers/Recent%20Working%20Pap
ers1.htm.
Table 2
Estimated Clubs for different health care expenditures.
Variable Club 1 Club 2 Club 3 Club 4 Divergent States
Panel I. Sample 1966–2014
PHCE AK CT DE FL
ID IL IN IA
KS KY LA ME
MD MA MI MN
MS MO MT NE
NH NJ NY NC
ND OH OK OR PA RI SC SD
VT WA WV WI
WY
AL AZ AR CA
CO GA HI NV
NM TN TX UT
VA
Panel II. Sample 1991–2014
PHCE AK CT DE DC FL
IL IN IA KY LA
ME MD MA MI MN
MS MO MT NE NH
NJ NY ND OH OK
OR PA RI SD VT
VA WA WV WI WY
AL AZ AR CA
CO HI ID KS
NV NM NC SC
TN TX
GA UT
Medicare AL AK AZ CT
DE FL IN KY
ME MD MA MI
MN MS MO NE
NH NJ NM NY
NC OH OR PA
RI SC SD TN
VT WV WI
AR CA CO DC
GA HI ID IL
IA KS LA MT
NV ND OK TX
UT VA WA WY
Medicaid AK AZ AR CA
CT DE DC IA
KY LA ME MD
MA MN MS MO
NM NY OH OK
OR PA RI VT
WV
AL CO FL HI
ID IL IN MI
MT NJ NC ND
SC TN TX VA
WA WI WY
GA KS NE NV
NH SD UT
Private Health Insurance MA NH ND AK NY VT WI
WY CT ME NJ
CA CO DE IL
IA KS KY MD
MN MO NE OR PA RI SD UT
WA WV
AZ FL GA HI IN LA MI MT
NM OH OK SC
TN TX VA
AL AR DC ID MS NV NC
The clubs reported have been obtained by applying the algorithm proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007) which aims to find groups of regions with similar convergence
speeds to the average. Adjacent clubs have been joined if suggested by the statistic proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007). Details of this club merging are given in the
Appendix.
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the null hypothesis of convergence for these three variables. However, as
occurred for PHCE, we can observe the presence of different clubs of
convergence, the estimations of these clubs being reported in Table 2.
According to these results, we can reject the existence of a single pattern
of behavior, as occurred with the PHCE.
These clubs are mapped in Fig. 1b–d. The analysis of these figures
suggests that the estimated clubs are quite different for the three health
expenditures that we have considered. To verify this point, we have
employed some non-parametric statistics to test the null hypothesis of the
equity of the medians. The Kruskal-Wallis and the van der Waerden
statistics take the values 64.0 and 67.7 for testing the null that the dis-
tributions of the three main payers of the PHCE have the same median.
Given that this statistic asymptotically goes towards a χ2 distribution of
G-1 degrees of freedom, with G being the number of variables under
analysis, we can clearly reject this hypothesis. Similarly, when these
estimated clubs are compared to those previously obtained for the PHCE,
the Kruskal-Wallis statistic takes the values 2.0, 8.3 and 57.9, respec-
tively for Medicare, Medicaid and personal health insurance expenditure.
Similarly, the van der Waerden statistic takes the values 2.3, 9.8 and
56.6, for the three mentioned variables. Thus, we should conclude that
the estimated convergence clubs for theMedicaid and the personal health
insurance expenditure are different from those estimated for the PHCE
and that the estimated clubs for the Medicare expenditure and for the
PHCE are not statistically different.4Fig. 2b and c presents, respectively, the average values of the Medi-
care and the Medicaid health expenditure of the states in the estimated
clubs. As we can see in Fig. 2. b, club 1 shows higher values than club 2,
with the difference between them increasing over time. At the beginning
of the sample, the distance between the average values of club 1 and 2 is
only 91$ (2017 $US) but at the end of the sample this distance is 342$
(2017 $US), the maximum difference in the sample.
If we now consider the case of Medicaid expenditures, Fig. 2. c reports
the average value of the health expenditure of the states included in clubs
1–3. The Medicaid expenditures of the members of club 1 grow at a rate
of around 4.2% which is higher than the growth rate of the other clubs.
Consequently, the distance between club 1 and the others increases over
time. Something similar occurs with clubs 2 and 3, which show growth
rates of 3.6 and 2.7, respectively. As a consequence, the final distance
between the average health expenditure of these clubs multiplies the
initial distance by almost 7. We can also appreciate that these average
values exhibit a clear slowdown during the years prior to the Great
Recession. Since then, the average values of clubs 1 and 2 continue to
grow, but those of club 3 have not returned to the 901$, its maximum
value in 2004.
Finally, we should analyze the results for the PHIE. We include it
because it represents approximately one-third of the total PHCE, but the
available sample is not very large and, therefore, the results obtained
should be interpreted with some caution. First, we can observe the
rejection of the null hypothesis of convergence and we find the presence
Fig. 1. Estimated clubs. Fig. 1a Personal Health Care Expenditure. Fig. 1b Medicare expenditure. Fig. 1c Medicaid expenditure. Fig. 1d. Private health insurance
expenditure.
3 See Gottlieb et al. (2010), Skinner (2011), Finkelstein et al. (2016), Callison
et al. (2018), Cutler et al. (2018) and Agha et al. (2019), in this regard. These
papers assume the existence of health regional variations, although they do not
J. Clemente et al. Economic Modelling xxx (xxxx) xxxof 4 convergence clubs and, additionally, 7 divergent states, this result
clearly related to the lack of information. Fig. 2d presents the
geographical distribution of the states. This map is clearly different to the
preceding ones. We can observe that the states included in the North East
US Census Region, except PA, are included in clubs 1 and 2, the ones with
the highest level of health expenditure. By contrast, club 4 contains most
states located in the south of the country. Moreover, AR, MS and AL
diverge, taking very low values at the end of the sample. A similar
divergent trend is observed for NV, ID and NC, whilst DC diverges in the
opposite direction.
If we now turn to the analysis of the average values of the estimated
clubs, Fig. 2. d., we observe that the average values of clubs 1–4 are
bounded between the data of two divergent states: DC and NV. The per
capita personal health insurance expenditure of DC is around 6000$
(2017 $US) in 2014. The values of this state are clearly the greatest, in
spite of showing a clear reduction since 2011 (around 10%). By
contrast, the lowest values are those of NV, which exhibit a per capita
personal health insurance expenditure of 2115$ (2017 $US) in 2014.
Furthermore, the values of the rest of the divergent states are located
between the values of NV and those of club 4. The average values of
clubs 1 and 2 are not very different. In fact, both of them are almost
identical up to 2007. They exhibit similar average growth rates (2.8
and 2.5), with those of club 1 showing a small reduction since 2011.
Finally, the average values of clubs 3 and 4 are lower than those of
clubs 1 and 2.53.3. Factors driving the club formation
The previous results prove the existence of serious regional variations
in health care expenditure in the US states. Whilst these regional varia-
tions have been analyzed recently,3 relatively little is known about their
causes. In order to contribute to this literature and to better understand
the creation of the estimated clubs, Table 3 reflects the average values of
the possible driving factors for each estimated club. We have included
some variables in order to capture demographic differences: the per-
centage of Hispanic population over the total population (HISPA), the
percentage of black population over the total population (BLACK), the
percentage of population younger than 18 (L18), and the percentage of
population older than 65 (G65). We have also taken into consideration
some socioeconomic variables, such as the per capita GDP (GDPpc), the
unemployment rate (UR), and the Cook Partisan Voting Index (CPVI). We
have also considered some variables in order to capture the supply-side
factors: the Acute Care Hospital Beds per 1000 Residents (HB), the
number of physicians per 100,000 Residents (PHY), and the number of
specialists per 100,000 Residents (SPEC). Finally, we have added some
health care outcome variables in order to reflect the health status of theprove it from a statistical point of view.
a. PHCE b. Medicare expenditure
0
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1500
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2500
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Fig. 2. Average value of the estimated clubs. Fig. 2a. PHCE. This figure presents the average values of the per capita PHCE of the states included in clubs 1 and 2 when
the 1966–2014 sample is considered. Fig. 2b. Medicare expenditure. This figure presents the average values of the per capita Medicare health expenditure of the states
in clubs 1 and 2 when the 1991–2014 sample is considered. Fig. 2c. Medicaid expenditure. This figure presents the average values of the per capita Medicaid health
expenditure of the states in clubs 1–3, when the 1991–2014 sample is considered. Fig. 2d. Private health insurance expenditure. This figure presents the average values
of the per capita private health insurance of the states included in clubs 1–4, as well as the values of the non-convergent states, when the 2001–2014 sample
is considered.
J. Clemente et al. Economic Modelling xxx (xxxx) xxxUS states. These variables are infant mortality rate per 100,000 in-
habitants (IMR) and the life expectancy of each state (LE).
If we begin by analyzing the factors associated with the estimated
clubs of PHCE, we can observe that the states included in club 1 exhibit a
better economic situation than those in club 2 because the average per
capita GDP is higher, whilst the average unemployment rate is slightly
lower. By contrast, the states included in club 1 show lower values of
young people and Hispanic population. If we take into account the
supply-side factors, the average number of hospital beds does not vary
much, but we find statistical differences in the number of physicians and
specialists. Finally, we cannot appreciate differences in the health care
outcome variables, the average values of infant mortality rates and life
expectancy being almost identical in both estimated clubs.
If we now focus on the estimated clubs for Medicare expenditures, the
results change slightly. The average value of the per capita GDP and the
education level do not allow us to appreciate any differences between the
characteristics of the two estimated clubs. By contrast, the average values
of the unemployment rates are slightly different. The influence of the
supply-side factors seems to be important and the number of specialists
and physicians is greater in the states in club 1, although the differences
are not statistically significant. Finally, we have found some differences
in the average values of the CPVI and, as a consequence, Medicare ex-
penditures are higher in states where the Republican Party received
comparatively low support. The average values of the healthcare
outcome variables are similar for both estimated clubs.
The results for the Medicaid expenditures are in line with those of
Medicare expenditures. However, we can observe that the average values
of SPEC and, to a lesser extent, of PHY are lower in the states included in
the clubs with the lowest levels of expenditure. We can see that6unemployment rates are clearly different, as could be expected. We also
find a great dependence on the CPVI and the bigger the support for the
Republican Party, the lower theMedicaid expenditures. Lastly, we should
note that the average values of the infant mortality rates and those of life
expectancy are statistically similar. Consequently, there is no relationship
between health expenditures and improvement in health status, as
occurred with PHCE and Medicare expenditures.
Finally, the results related to the estimated clubs for private health
insurance expenditures are somewhat different to the previous ones. First,
we observe that per capita GDP is significantly greater in the states in club
1, the one with the highest level of expenditure. Second, the average
values of PHY and SPEC are also greater in the states in club 1. But, the
most outstanding result is related to the values of the two variables which
measure the health status of the states. We can appreciate that the infant
mortality rates and the life expectancy of the states in clubs 1 and 4 are
different to those of the other clubs. The states in club 1 show significantly
lower infant mortality rates and greater values of life expectancy. By
contrast, the states in club 4 show significantly greater infant mortality
rates and lower values of life expectancy. This suggests the existence of a
clear connection between health expenditure and health status, whichwas
not found for the other health expenditures considered in this paper.
4. Conclusions and policy implications
The literature that analyzes differences in health expenditure be-
tween territories has grown recently. This kind of study is especially
relevant for the US given the dimension of health care expenditure in this
country, significantly higher than other countries, and the peculiarities of
the US health system, in which the main public programs Medicare and
Table 3
Factors driving the clubs.
Club PCHE Medicare Medicaid PHIE Club PCHE Medicare Medicaid PHIE
BLACK 1 9.8 11.1 10.4 3.3 HB12 1 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.0
2 11.2 8.7 10.8 6.1 2 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.0
3 7.6 7.7 3 2.1 2.1
4 13.5 4 2.2
HISPA 1 8.2 9.8 11.2 5.4 PHY 1 206 209 210 230
2 20.1 13.8 11.5 9.9 2 191 191 197 232
3 11.2 11.0 3 189 201
4 14.1 4 193
L18 1 24.1 23.8 24.0 22.7 SPEC 1 127 129 130 139
2 25.6 25.6 24.5 23.4 2 119 118 123 144
3 26.4 24.8 3 115 124
4 24.7 4 120
G65 1 14.8 14.6 14.4 14.3 IMR 1 5.9 6.0 6.0 4.6
2 14.4 14.9 14.8 14.5 2 6.0 5.9 6.0 5.5
3 15.4 14.9 3 5.6 5.6
4 14.5 4 6.4
GDPpc 1 46,959 45,757 46,208 56,337 LE 1 78.7 78.6 78.5 80.1
2 42,962 46,185 45,894 53,521 2 78.5 78.6 78.7 79.7
3 45,005 46,332 3 79.1 79.0
4 42,384 4 78.0
UR 1 5.6 6.0 6.1 4.2
2 6.1 5.5 5.6 5.7
3 4.9 5.6
4 6.0
CPVI 1 3.5 1.7 0.9 1.7
2 3.5 6.3 4.6 1.1
3 9.3 2.6
4 4.9
This table presents the average values of the variables employed to analyze the forces driving the formation of the clubs. The bold values for the PHCE and Medicare
clubs reject the null hypothesis that the differences between club averages are 0, using a 5% significance level. The bold values for the Medicaid and PHIE clubs imply
that the club average is not included in a 95% confidence interval of the largest club.
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the previous papers consider the existence of regional variations,
although they do not prove statistically its existence.
In order to provide evidence of the existence of significant regional
variations, we have first studied the evolution and convergence of the US
state health expenditure. We test for convergence in the health expen-
ditures of the US states by using the methodology recently developed in
Phillips and Sul (2007) for a sample that covers 1966–2014, employing
per capita health data by State of Residence. Our results provide robust
evidence against the null hypothesis of convergence. Rather, we can
observe the existence of different convergence clubs. This conclusion is
somewhat different to the one obtained in Apergis et al. (2017) where
some modifications of the panel data statistics proposed by Im et al.
(2003) are used in order to test for convergence for a sample that covers
1966–2009. According to these authors, there is robust evidence in favor
to the convergence hypothesis. However, the use of a different method-
ology and the extension of the sample have allowed us to provide robust
evidence against the presence of a single pattern of behavior.
If we disaggregate the PHCE, we can also reject the null of conver-
gence for the three main payers of the US total health expenditure:
Medicare, Medicaid and private health insurance expenditure. We also
observe the presence of different convergence clubs in these cases.
The analysis of the causes of the creation of these estimated clubs has
led us some interesting insights. We have observed that the economic
situation is an important factor determining the formation of clubs. The
per capita GDP is helpful to explain the differences between the esti-
mated clubs of PHCE and private health insurance expenditures. In both
cases, the higher the per capita GDP, the larger the health expenditure.
The unemployment rate is a key variable to explain the formation of clubs
of Medicaid expenditure, as could be expected.
The percentage of people younger than 18 is also important to explain
the estimated clubs of both Medicare and Medicaid expenditure. More-
over, we find that the larger the support for the Republican party, the
lower the Medicaid and, to lesser extent, the Medicare expenditures. This7result suggests the possible existence of a partisan behavior. However, we
consider that it might be reflecting a much more general aspect, namely,
the influence of environment-level factors on health expenditures, as has
been recently studied in Molitor (2018).
Similarly, supply-side factors are important to understand the for-
mation of clubs of PHCE, Medicaid and private insurance health expen-
ditures. The greater these expenditures, the more physicians and, to
lesser extent, specialists.
Finally, we have not found significant differences between the esti-
mated clubs of PHCE, Medicare and Medicaid expenditures with respect
to the values of the variables employed to measure the health status of
the states, that is, infant mortality rates and life expectancy. Therefore,
we should conclude that the health status is independent of these three
types of health expenditures.
This result is quite important because it casts some doubts on the
efficiency of a very important part of the US health expenditures. It
suggests that increasing health expenditures in programs such as Medi-
care and Medicaid does not result in a comparatively similar improve-
ment of the health status. Consequently, similar levels of infant mortality
rates and life expectancy could be achieved with lower health expendi-
ture levels. This result is consistent with those of Cutler et al. (2018).
According to these authors, a possible explanation for regional health
expenditure differences is the existence of some beliefs of physicians
which are not supported by clinical evidence. Thus, they cause an in-
crease in expenditures, but without benefiting patients. Although more
evidence in this line is necessary, these results invite policymakers to
adopt policies aimed at favoring regional health expenditure conver-
gence by controlling the health risk that arises from the use of scantly
effective or, simply, unnecessary health care services.
Finally, we should note that the states with the highest private health
insurance expenditures also show the lowest infant mortality rates and
the largest life expectancy values. Therefore, private insurance health
expenditures seem to be much more efficient, because they result in clear
improvements in health status, than the other expenditures.
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Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2019.02.011.
Appendix
As we have mentioned, we have employed the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter in order to extract the trend component of the variables. Given that
this filter is quite sensitive to the selection of the smoothing parameter, it is advisable to consider different values of this parameter and analyze the
robustness of the results obtained. Following Ravn and Uhlig (2002), we consider that λ¼ {100, 25, 6.25}. Table A.1 presents the results that we have
obtained, together with the ones presented in the paper, which were obtained using the standard λ¼ 400. As we can observe, the effect of the selection
of the parameter λ is quite small in this case and, consequently, we should conclude that the results are robust to its selection, at least as far as the
estimation of the parameter β in model (3) is concerned. A larger variation can be observed for the t-statistic, especially if we consider the value λ¼ 6.25.
However, we can reject the null hypothesis of convergence in all the cases, so our conclusion is robust in this regard.
Additionally, we have included the club-merging analysis for the different health expenditures in Tables A.2-A.6. Finally, Figures A.1.a–A.1.d
present the transition path curves for the different estimated clubs we have obtained. The analysis of these figures lead us to similar conclusions that
those drawn for Fig. 2a–d.Table A.1
Testing for convergence for different values of the parameter λ.
λ Estimated β t-ratio8400 1.004 23.279
100 0.979 21.499
25 0.968 23.186
6.25 0.968 30.354This table presents the values of the estimation of the parameter
β and its corresponding t-ratio when we employ equation (3) to
test the null hypothesis of convergence for the PCHE. These
values are obtained under the application of the Hodrick-
Prescott filter for the values of the parameter λ reflected in
the first column.Table A.2
Club Convergence of PCHE. Sample 1966–2014.
Estimated clubs Estimated β t-ratioClub 1.
AK CT DE FL ID IL IN IA KS KY LA ME MD MA MI MN MS MO MT NE NH NJ NY NC ND OH OK OR PA RI SC SD VT WA WV WI WY0.278 3.780Club 2.
AL AZ AR CA CO GA HI NV NM TN TX UT VA0.648 16.822The estimated β and the t-ratio are obtained from the estimation of equation (3). Statistical significance at the 5% level is denoted by ‘a’, rejecting the null hypothesis of
convergence.
Table A.3
Club Convergence of PCHE. Sample 1991–2014.
Estimated β t-ratioPanel A. Estimated clubs
Club 1.
AK CT DE DC FL IL IN IA KY LA ME MD MA MI MN MS MO MT NE NH NJ NY ND OH OK OR PA RI SD VT VA WA WV WI WY0.162 4.543Club 2.
AL AZ AR CA CO HI ID KS NV NM NC SC TN TX0.096 1.117Club 3.
GA UT1.457 15.145Panel B. Club merging analysis
Club 1 þ 2 1.027 207.556a
Club 2 þ 3 0.596 28.981aThe estimated β and the t-ratio are obtained from the estimation of equation (3). Statistical significance at the 5% level is denoted by ‘a’, rejecting the null hypothesis of
convergence.
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Club Convergence of medicare expenditures. Sample 1991–2014.
Estimated Clubs Estimated β t-ratio9Club 1.
AL AK AZ CT DE FL IN KY ME MD MA MI MN MS MO NE NH NJ NM NY NC OH OR PA RI SC SD TN VT WV WI0.099 2.649Club 2.
AR CA CO DC GA HI ID IL IA KS LA MT NV ND OK TX UT VA WA WY0.056 1.078The estimated β and the t-ratio are obtained from the estimation of equation (3). Statistical significance at the 5% level is denoted by ‘a’, rejecting the null
hypothesis of convergence.Table A.5
Club Convergence of Medicaid expenditures. Sample 1991–2014
Estimated β t-ratioPanel A. Estimated Clubs
Club 1.
AK AZ AR CA CT DE DC IA KY LA ME MD MA MN MS MO NM NY OH OK OR PA RI VT WV0.011 0.321Club 2.
AL CO FL HI ID IL IN MI MT NJ NC ND SC TN TX VA WA WI WY0.460 4.825Club 3.
GA KS NE NV NH SD UT0.341 2.696Panel B. Club merging analysis
Club 1 þ 2 0.702 28.648a
Club 2 þ 3 0.454 12.686aThe estimated β and the t-ratio are obtained from the estimation of equation (3). Statistical significance at the 5% level is denoted by ‘a’, rejecting
the null hypothesis of convergence.Table A.6
Club Convergence of private health insurance expenditures.
Estimated β t-ratioPanel A. Estimated Clubs
Club 1.
MA NH ND0.520 2.539Club 2.
AK NY VT WI WY0.500 3.366Club 3.
CT ME NJ0.100 0.782Club 4.
CA CO DE IL IA KS KY MD MN MO NE OR PA RI SD UT WA WV0.057 0.581Club 5.
AZ FL GA HI IN LA MI MT NM OH OK SC TN TX VA0.333 2.547Panel B. Club merging analysis
Club 1 þ 2 0.199 1.906a
Club 2 þ 3 0.075 0.635
Club 2 þ 3þ4 0.747 17.305a
Club 4 þ 5 0.743 16.009aThe estimated β and the t-ratio are obtained from the estimation of equation (3). Statistical significance at the 5% level
is denoted by ‘a’, rejecting the null hypothesis of convergence.Data Source.
Acronym Definition SourceHB Acute Care Hospital Beds per 1000 Residents in 2012. https://www.dartmouthat
las.org/PHY All physicians per 100,000 Residents in 2011 https://www.dartmouthat
las.org/SPEC All specialist per 100,000 Residents in 2011. https://www.dartmouthat
las.org/GDPpc Per capita GDP of the state in 2014 https://fred.stlouisfed.org
UR Unemployment rate of the state in 2014 https://beta.bls.gov
CPVI The Cook Partisan Voting Index in each states based on the 2012 and 2016 presidential election. We have randomly assigned positive
values to those states supporting the Republican party.
https://www.cookpolit
ical.com/L18 Percentage of population in the states younger than 18 in 2014. https://www.kff.org/
G65 Percentage of population in the state older than 65 in 2014. https://www.kff.org/
BLACK The percentage of black population over the total population of the state in 2014 https://www.kff.org/
HISPA The percentage of hispanic population over the total population of the state in 2014 https://www.kff.org/
IMR Infant Mortality rate of each state in 2014 http://wonder.cdc.gov
LE Life expectancy of each state in 2014 http://wonder.cdc.gov
Economic Modelling xxx (xxxx) xxxJ. Clemente et al.Fig. A.1. Transition paths for the estimated convergence clubs.References
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